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Abstract
This paper uses data on German consumer magazines observed between 1992 and 2004 to analyze the
extent to which consumers (dis-)like advertising. We estimate logit demand models separately for the
six most important magazine segments in terms of circulation. We find little evidence for readers
disliking advertising. On the contrary, we show that readers in many magazine segments appreciate
advertising.
Readers of Women's magazines, Business and politics magazines as well as Car magazines — market
segments where advertisements are relatively more informative — appreciate advertising while
advertising is nuisance to readers of Adult magazines, a segment where advertisements are particularly
uninformative. Demand for interior design magazines is not well identified. Our logit demand estimates
are confirmed by logit demand models with random coefficients and by magazine-specific monopoly
demand models.
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1 Introduction
The economics of two–sided markets have recently caught the attention of many
economists. Such markets have the property that there are two distinct types of
users, each of which wishes to interact on a common platform.
A prototypical example for a two–sided market is the media industry,
as first explicitly noticed by Sonnac (2000). Media content producers need to
attract two types of consumers: advertisers who value the medium more the more
consumers it reaches and consumers who have a (dis–) taste for advertising.
This interdependency creates network effects whose consequences for
pricing, efficiency and information supply is in the focus of a rapidly growing
body of theoretical papers. Most contributions — for example Anderson (2005);
Anderson and Coate (2000); Ambrus and Reisinger (2005); Choi (2006); Crampes
et al. (2004); Gabszewics et al. (2004); Kind et al. (2003); Kohlschein (2004);
Kremhelmer and Zenger (forthcoming); Peitz and Valetti (forthcoming); Nilssen
and Sørgard (2003) and Reisinger (2004) — assume that consumers dislike ad-
vertising. Exceptions are Ha¨ckner and Nyberg (2000), who assume that readers
like advertising in a print media context, and Sonnac (2000), who considers feed-
backs from advertising to circulation under the two alternative assumptions of
consumer advertising aversion and advertising appreciation.
Whether consumers appreciate advertising or not has important implica-
tions for the pricing structure on two-sided markets. In markets where readers are
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advertising-neutral, the market collapses into a one–sided market with a network
externality running from readers to advertisers. Market structure is truly two-
sided when readers are not advertising-neutral (and advertisers appreciate more
readers). Compared to a one-sided market setting, magazines charge lower ad-
vertising rates when readers appreciate advertising and higher advertising rates
when readers dislike advertising. Independently of whether consumers like or
dislike advertising, magazines always have incentives to charge copy prices that
are lower than in a one–sided market to enhance advertising demand (as long
as advertisers value readers). If advertisers have no appreciation for readers and
readers are advertising neutral, media markets constitute a standard one–sided
market.
The present paper estimates readers’ taste for advertising. We use quar-
terly data on magazine circulation in Germany, the second largest print media
market in the world (FIPP 2004). We estimate consumer demand for the six
most relevant magazine segments in terms of circulation and advertising revenue
using a discrete choice demand model.
Since we estimate a consumer utility function, we can draw inference
about consumer preferences based on the sign and magnitude of the corresponding
characteristics coefficients. We treat both price and advertising as endogenous
variables in our estimations, thereby recognizing that advertising share, defined
as the ratio of advertising pages to content (non–advertising) pages, may be
correlated with demand shocks or unobserved quality shocks.
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Our main result is that there is little evidence for readers disliking ad-
vertising. On the contrary, we show that readers in most magazine segments
actually appreciate advertising. Consumers of TV and Women’s magazines ap-
preciate advertising most, followed by consumers of Car and Business and politics
magazines. Consumers of Adult magazines are indifferent with respect to adver-
tisements. Demand for Interior design magazines is not well identified.
A supply side explanation is that each magazine segment carries adver-
tisements that come with different degrees of informativeness. In order to explore
this explanation further, we purchased samples of magazines from each segment
and measured the degree to which advertising is informative, thereby using a
methodology developed by Resnik and Stern (1977). We find that the degree
to which advertising is informative is above average in the Women’s, Car and
TV magazine segments. This finding, combined with our estimation results, sug-
gests that consumers appear to appreciate advertisements in segments with a
high degree of advertising informativeness. We interpret this as consumers liking
informative advertising.
These findings can be explained by both demand side and supply side
factors. A demand side explanation is that consumers in different segments are
heterogenous with respect to their advertising preferences. For example, a typical
TV magazine consumer may appreciate advertising more than a typical Car or
Business and politics magazine consumer.
Our results suggest that assuming consumers dislike advertising may not
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be an appropriate assumption. Kaiser and Wright (2006) consider eight German
duopoly markets for magazines and find positive effects of advertising on circula-
tion as wll. Bogart (1989) and Rosse (1980) consider US newspapers and provide
a similar conclusion using simple linear (monopoly) demand models that do not
account for potential endogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our
empirical model. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 present our empirical
results. Specification tests follow in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical approach
2.1 Empirical model
Our main empirical model maps the magazine characteristics such as copy price,
the number of content pages and our variable of main interest, the number of
advertising pages relative to the number of content pages, to magazine mar-
ket shares. We estimate logit demand models separately for the six segments
Women’s, Business and politics, Car, Interior design, TV and Adult magazines.
The model assumes that magazines in the same segment are potential
substitutes to one another. This assumption is substantiated by Dewenter and
Kaiser (2007) who use second choice data from a consumer survey to show that
a magazine’s best substitutes is a magazine from the same segment. We test this
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assumption in Section 5 by estimating cross elasticities using a log-linear demand
model. However, we ignore possible complementarity between different segments.
We are aware of that the logit model we use has limited substitution
patterns. That is, the own- and cross-price elasticities are solely determined by
the price coefficient and market shares. Moreover, consumer heterogeneity is in-
dependent of magazine characteristics. Using random coefficients mitigates these
limitations, but we are skeptical about identifying the random coefficient with
our data set. Consumer distributions from multiple markets or micro choice data
are commonly used to identify the random coefficient logit model (Nevo 2001;
Petrin 2002). We do not, however, have micro choice data or even multimarket
data at our disposal. Moreover, we observe the same market repeatedly over time
so we would need to fix the consumer distribution for all periods. Despite our
data restrictions we estimate the random coefficient logit model and report the
corresponding estimation results in Section 5 to support the evidence generated
by our logit model without random coefficients.
Our demand model defines indirect consumer utility as
uijt = xjtβ − αpjt + γt + ηj + ξjt + εijt, (1)
where xjt denotes product j’s observed characteristics at time t, pjt product j
′s
price at time t, γt time dummy variables, ηj a magazine–specific dummy variable,
ξjt magazine-specific unobserved characteristics at time t and εijt an idiosyncratic
logit error term. The observed characteristics include a constant term, the num-
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ber of content pages, advertising share and a dummy variable for magazines not
published quarterly. The term ηj controls for magazine specific quality that does
not vary over time. We include this dummy variable for magazines we observe
for at least than ten periods.
Our model requires the definition of “market size” which implicitly defines
the demand for the “outside good”. For Women’s magazines we use the number
of women above 14 years of age with German residency. For Adult magazines
and Business and politics magazines we use the number of males above 14 years
of age with Germany residency. For the other segments we use the number of
German residents above 14 years of age.
2.2 Identification
We allow for two endogenous variables in our estimation. One is price and the
other is advertising share. These two variables are likely to be correlated with
demand shocks or unobserved magazine characteristics, the term ξjt in Equation
(1). We interpret ξjt as a content-related quality shock that consumers observe
but the econometrician does not. All other things being equal, a positive quality
shock is likely to increase price but decrease advertising share. So we expect an
unobserved quality shock to be positively correlated with price and negatively
correlated with advertising share. However, this unobserved quality shock is
unlikely to be correlated across magazine segments.
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We therefore use observed characteristics in other segments as instru-
mental variables. Our identifying assumption is that a magazine’s unobserved
quality shock in a given period is not correlated with observed magazine charac-
teristics in the other segments in the same period. For example, a quality shock
in the Women’s magazine segment should not affect prices in the Adult magazine
segment. For each magazine in a given period we compute its own publisher’s
average price and advertising share in the other five segments in the same period.
We also compute the other publishers’ average prices and advertising shares in
the other five segments. This produces five own publisher’s average prices, five
own publisher’s advertising shares, five other publishers’ average prices and five
other publishers’ advertising shares for each magazine in each period.
In order for our instruments not to be weak, observed characteristics
should be correlated across segments. We argue that the same publisher’s ob-
served characteristics are correlated due to common cost factors. Magazine char-
acteristics of different segments are also correlated across publishers because of
an oligopolistic market structure.
We formally test if our instruments are valid. We first test if our instru-
ments are highly correlated with the endogenous variables by running auxiliary
regressions of the endogenous variables on the instruments and the exogenous
variables. Test results reported in Table 1 show that our instruments are jointly
statistically highly significantly different from zero. Many instruments are also
separately highly significant (not shown in the table). We also test if our in-
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struments are uncorrelated with the error terms by running Sargan tests for
orthogonality. These tests confirm that orthogonality cannot be rejected for any
specification.
We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with the moment
conditions
E
[
Z′jξj
]
= 0,
where Zj is a matrix of instrumental variables for magazine j and ξj is a vector of
unobservable characteristics. We use (Z′Z)−1 as the weighting matrix and allow
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in computing standard errors. In
particular, the asymptotic variance is
Asy.V ar. (θ) = [(X′Z)W (Z′X)]−1 (X′Z)WΛW (Z′X) [(X′Z)W (Z′X)]−1
where W =(Z′Z)−1 and Λ =(Z′ξξ′Z) .
3 Data
We use publicly available data on magazine circulation, cover prices, content
pages and advertising pages from http://medialine.focus.de. The data spans 52
quarters from the first quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 2004. This data
has been originally collected by “Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der
Verbreitung von Werbetra¨gern e.V.”, the German equivalent to the US Audit
Bureau of Circulation.
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Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory
variables involved in the estimations for each segment. The “between” standard
deviation is the variation in the same segment across magazines and the “within”
standard deviation is the variation across time for a specific magazine. The
“between” variation is considerably larger than the “within” variation for almost
all variables and magazine segments. This helps us identifying the discrete choice
demand model as the model is identified by variation across magazines in the same
segment and time period.
The table shows that the average circulation across all magazines is
313,770. TV magazines have by far the largest circulation and Interior design
magazines have the smallest. Women’s magazines is the segment with most titles,
51, while there are only ten titles in the Adult magazine segment.
The average copy price is 0.94 Euro across all segments. Prices are highest
in the Business and politics segment, followed by the Adult and the Interior design
segments. It is lowest in the TV segment, followed by the Women’s segment.
However, the number of content pages does not seem to be reflected in price
differences. TV magazines have 953 content pages on average while Business and
politics magazines have 708 content pages on average. Adult magazines have
325 content pages on average, while Women’s magazines have 480 content pages
on average. Thus, it is important to control the magazine specific unobserved
quality, ηj in Equation (1).
The advertising share is 0.41 on average but varies considerably across
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magazines. It is lowest in the TV magazine segment where it is 0.21 and highest
in the Business and politics segment where it is 0.66. Note that we calculate the
advertising share by dividing advertising pages by content pages. An advertising
share of 0.40 hence means that the number of advertising pages is 40 given a
total page count of 140. The Interior design segment is the only segment where
the “within” variation is larger than the “between” variation. It may therefore
be hard to identify advertising preference for this segment.
4 Empirical findings
4.1 Estimation results
We report demand estimates in Table 2. In the logit specification without in-
struments demand is inelastic in all segments except for Adult magazines, and
the price coefficient is even positive in the Interior design segment. In the Adult
segment the price coefficient is smaller than -3 and statistically significant. The
advertising share coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all seg-
ments other than Interior design. Advertising elasticities range from 0.098 in the
Women’s segment to 0.272 in the TV magazine segment. An advertising elasticity
of 0.1 means that the market share increases by 0.1 percent when the advertising
share increases by 1 percent. In the Interior design segment, the advertising share
coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant.
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In the IV logit specification the price coefficient is statistically significant
in all segments except for Interior design where it is positive and significant
without instruments but negative and insignificant with instruments. Its absolute
magnitude significantly increases in the Women’s, the Business and politics as
well as the TV magazines segments such that demand is now elastic. In the Adult
magazine segment it is lower than in the previous specification but demand is still
elastic. In the Car segment it goes down slightly and demand is still inelastic.
The advertising share coefficient increases in all segments once advertis-
ing share is instrumented with the exception of Adult magazines where it goes
down from 0.511 to 0.077. In the Interior design segment it changes signs from
negative to positive but remains statistically insignificant. The advertising elas-
ticity increases significantly in all other segments. It is 0.617 in the Women’s
segment, 0.583 in the Business and politics segment, 0.419 in the car segment
and 0.349 in the TV segment.
These results indicate that the price and the advertising share variables
are endogenous and that our instruments mitigate the endogeneity problem. In
most magazine segments we identify consumer demand reasonably well, and
changes in signs and magnitudes after instrumentation are consistent with our
expectations. However, we are not able to identify demand for the Interior design
segment and for Adult magazines the advertising share coefficient is statistically
not significant.
Our IV estimates show that consumers appreciate advertising in most
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magazine segments. The advertising elasticity is less than one in all segments,
but its magnitude is economically significant. For example, consumers in the
Women’s magazines segment are willing to pay two (Euro–) Cents more to have
ten more advertising pages in a magazine with 400 content pages. In the TV
magazine segment consumers are willing to pay about 1.3 Cents more for the
same increase in the number of advertising pages of similarly sized magazines.
4.2 Supply side and demand side explanations
These results may show that consumers are heterogenous across segments with
respect to advertising appreciation. Consumers in the TV and the Women’s mag-
azine segments appreciate advertising most, followed by consumers in the Car and
the Business and politics magazine segments. However, the order changes with
respect to the willingness to pay for more advertising pages because of differences
in the price elasticity across segments. Consumers in the Car segment have the
highest willingness to pay because of their low price elasticity. Consumers in the
Women’s and the Business and politics segments have a similar willingness to
pay.
We also consider a supply side factor to explain the difference in the
degree of advertising appreciation across segments: each magazine segment may
carry different types of advertising. For example, if magazines in one segment
carry more informative advertising than the others and consumers like informative
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advertising, we may observe this differences in advertising appreciation across
segments.
Our data do not, however, contain information on whether advertise-
ments are “informative” or “persuasive”. We therefore purchased 26 copies of
magazines from each of our six segments and tracked the informational content
of the advertisements in these magazines. We followed a methodology introduced
by Resnik and Stern (1977) and lately applied by Franke et al. (2004).
Resnik and Stern (1977) identify fourteen “evaluative criteria” that in-
dicate if an advertisement is informative or not. In their methodology, an ad-
vertisement is to be regarded as “informative” if it contains at least one piece of
information regarding (1) price or value, (2) quality, (3) performance, (4) com-
ponents or contents, (5) availability, (6) special offers, (7) taste, (8) packaging or
shape, (9) guarantees or warranties, (10) safety, (11) nutrition, (12) independent
research, (13) company sponsored research and (14) new ideas.
We count how many of these information contents each advertisement
in the 26 magazines contains. The results are displayed in Appendix A. Adver-
tisements contain 1.89 pieces of information on average. Segments with above
average informational content are TV (with a information count of 2.29 per ad-
vertisement), Car (2.28) and Women’s magazines (2.13). Segments with slightly
less than on average information counts include Business and politics (1.72) and
Interior design (1.76). Adult magazines contain the least informative advertise-
ments. The count here is 1.33 per advertisement.
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We interpret advertisements in TV, car and women magazine as relatively
informative whereas advertisements in adult magazines as relatively uninforma-
tive and perhaps persuasive. Advertisements in Business and politics as well
as Interior design magazines are considered as intermediate cases. This result
combined with our estimates suggest that consumers appreciate advertisement
with informative contents and we interpret this as consumers liking informative
advertising.
4.3 Implications
What do these findings imply for the pricing on print media markets? In market
segments where readers are advertising–neutral the two–sided market collapses
into a one–sided market with externalities — the feedback of circulation on ad-
vertising pricing. In such a market, magazines have incentives to subsidize ad-
vertising revenue by setting copy prices lower than in a market setting without
feedback. Such a market is considered by Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) as
well as Kaiser (2007).
In segments where advertisers value readers and readers value advertising,
the market structure is truly two–sided and network externalities are positive on
both market sides. Kaiser and Wright (2006) calculate the size of the (positive)
network externalities on both market sides. Based on a Hotelling–type demand
model, they predict that advertising rates would increase by 5,059 Euros if readers
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were advertising–neutral instead of appreciating advertising. This corresponds to
a 50 percent increase in average advertising rates.
5 Other Specifications
We consider two alternative models: a monopoly model that generates magazine–
specific estimates and a random coefficients logit model.
5.1 Monopoly model
In our monopoly model we adopt a log–linear demand model and estimate maga-
zine demand for each magazine separately. We use data from the first quarter of
1973 to the fourth quarter of 2004 to extend the time series dimension of our data.
This allows us to identify model parameters without imposing any homogeneity
restrictions across magazines. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of circulation for each magazine and the explanatory variables are the same as in
the logit demand model except that they are in natural logarithms. We estimate
the model in fourth differences to account for seasonality and unit roots. This
means that we remove all time–invariant magazine–specific effects and that the
constant term in each magazine-specific equation constitutes the coefficient of a
linear time trend.
We use Mean Group Estimation as suggested by Pesaran and Smith (1995)
to aggregate our magazine–specific estimates across segments.
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Appendix B presents our magazine–specific estimation results and dis-
cusses identification issues with a summary of results. Our mean group estimates
are qualitatively identical to our IV logit findings: readers from the Women’s, the
Business and politics and the TV magazine segments appreciate advertising while
adult magazine readers are advertising neutral. Our Mean Group Estimates are
insignificant for the Interior design magazine segment.
While allowing for full heterogeneity across magazines appears appealing,
a major drawback of the monopoly model is that it does not allow for substitu-
tion across magazines within the same segment. In order to test if our monopoly
model is appropriate, we add prices of magazines in the same segment as addi-
tional regressors. Our monopoly model is rejected if the cross-price effects are
statistically significant.
Introducing cross-price effects does, however, substantially increase the
number of parameters to be estimated. We therefore impose symmetry conditions
in order to keep estimation tractable. We hence assume that e.g. the cross-
price effect of magazine A on magazine B is the same as the cross–price effect of
magazine B on magazine A. We then stack the magazine-specific equations within
the same segment and estimate them with system GMM for each segment.
As discussed in more detail in Appendix B, we find that the cross–price
effects are jointly significant for all magazine segments and each segment has a
fair number of separately statistically significant cross-effects. We therefore reject
the monopoly model in favor of our IV logit model that does allow for competition
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without an explosion in the number of parameters. It should be noted, however,
that we frequently encounter upward sloping demand curves and negative cross–
price effects in our log-linear model with cross-price effects so it seems that we
ask too much of our data when we try to identify this model.
5.2 Random Coefficient Logit Model
In the random coefficient logit model we allow the coefficients on the magazine
characteristics to be distributed normal, so we have βki = βk + συi for charac-
teristic k, where υi ∼ N (0, 1). We generate 1,000 simulated consumers for each
random coefficient and estimate the model following Berry (1994) and Berry et
al. (1995). However, as mentioned in Section 2.1, we do not have multi-market
data or micro data to help identifying consumer heterogeneity.
Appendix C reports estimation results for three different specifications
of the random coefficient logit model. In the first specification we put a random
coefficient on advertising share only. In the Women’s, the Business and politics
and the Car magazine segments the advertising share variable’s mean coefficient
is no longer identified, while its variance is identified only in the Women’s maga-
zine segment. In the TV magazine segment the advertising share variable’s mean
coefficient changes its sign and its variance is significant, but the price coefficient
becomes positive and insignificant. In the Adult magazine segment the advertis-
ing share variable’s mean coefficient now becomes significant and negative and
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its variance is significant as well. The absolute value of the price variable goes
down but is still significant.
In the second specification we put random coefficients on price and ad-
vertising share. Except for the TV and the adult magazine segments the variance
variables are not significant. In the TV segment the two variance variables are
significant and the mean price variable is negative and significant, but the ad-
vertising share variable’s mean coefficient is no longer significant. In the adult
magazine segment both price and advertising share have significant variance co-
efficients, and the mean price is negative and significant. The advertising share
variable’s mean coefficient is negative and significant at the ten percent signifi-
cance level.
In the third specification we add random coefficients on the constant
term. The identification does not improve in any segment. In the TV and the
adult magazine segments the variance of the price coefficient becomes insignifi-
cant, and the mean of the advertising share coefficient become insignificant in the
TV segment. However, in the adult magazine segment both the mean and the
variance of the advertising share variable are significant and the mean is negative.
6 Conclusion
The body of theoretical literature on the economics of two–sided markets is size-
able and steadily growing. A large fraction of that literature considers media
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markets since they constitute a prototypical example of a two–sided market.
However, most scholars assume that media consumers dislike advertising. We
empirically test this assumption on German magazine data. We use a discrete
choice demand model in an oligopolistic setting to estimate the utility function of
magazine consumption. We treat both price and advertising share as endogenous
variables and use magazine characteristics in other segments as instruments.
We show that consumers mostly appreciate advertising in magazines.
Consumers of TV and Women’s magazines appreciate advertising most, followed
by those in the Car and the Business and politics magazine segments. Consumers
of Adult magazines are indifferent. These differences across magazine segments
may be due to demand–side effects — consumer heterogeneity across segments —
and supply–side effects — consumers appear to be appreciating advertisements
more in segments where advertisements are more informative.
The latter hypothesis is confirmed by our data while the former cannot be
tested with the data we have at our disposal.
19
Table 1: F–tests for joint significance of the instruments for price and advertising
ratio
Price Advertising
Women’s magazines 669.37 163.75
Business/Politics magazines 137.75 12.25
Car magazines 92.64 30.78
Interior design magazines 241.92 3.88
TV magazines 423.13 63.77
Adult magazines 326.70 39.28
Table 1 displays F–test results for joint significance of our instruments for price and advertising
share in “first stage” regressions.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
All mag. Women Adult Busi. & pol.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Circulation Overall 313.77 458.40 370.78 414.61 160.00 157.91 292.45 397.47
(in 1,000) Between 398.37 368.72 114.81 361.43
Within 113.55 103.03 109.10 44.41
Price (real, Overall 0.94 0.54 0.73 0.45 1.06 0.54 1.28 0.52
in Euros) Between 0.53 0.42 0.51 0.51
Within 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12
Content pages Overall 401.42 441.35 480.14 317.85 325.24 266.55 708.23 704.45
Between 418.20 312.92 261.05 651.22
Within 66.61 36.00 55.63 162.94
Advertising Overall 0.41 0.32 0.41 0.28 0.27 0.17 0.66 0.41
share Between 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.29
Within 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.31
# obs. 7,708 1,996 359 682
# magazines 204 51 10 20
Car Int. Des. TV
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Circulation Overall 134.78 222.40 101.22 108.16 1,085.49 698.96
(in 1,000) Between 216.79 95.18 661.23
Within 25.08 13.57 289.18
Price (real, Overall 0.96 0.35 0.98 0.25 0.40 0.13
in Euros) Between 0.35 0.26 0.18
Within 0.11 0.04 0.02
Content pages Overall 217.45 196.85 60.41 20.50 953.64 333.08
Between 196.06 19.41 395.57
Within 33.18 9.56 94.16
Advertising Overall 0.46 0.22 0.55 0.71 0.21 0.15
share Between 0.19 0.27 0.13
Within 0.11 0.66 0.08
# obs. 583 495 753
# magazines 13 14 18
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables involved in
the IV logit estimations.
Table 3: Logit demand estimation results
IV Logit Logit
w/o instruments
Price Content Adshare Price Cont. Ads.
Women’s magazines
Coeff. -1.917*** 0.043*** 1.518*** -0.601*** -0.009 0.241***
Std. Err. 0.309 0.017 0.331 0.044 0.009 0.037
Business/Politics magazines
Coeff. -1.023*** 0.109*** 0.890*** -0.508*** 0.083*** 0.265***
Std. Err. 0.163 0.017 0.250 0.083 0.008 0.045
Car magazines
Coeff. -0.854*** 0.007 0.913*** -0.898*** 0.000 0.374***
Std. Err. 0.107 0.018 0.297 0.052 0.017 0.058
Interior design magazines
Coeff. -0.048 0.155* 0.032 0.231*** -0.003 -0.004
Std. Err. 0.148 0.110 0.028 0.104 0.068 0.010
TV magazines
Coeff. -3.153*** 0.059*** 1.686*** -0.559 0.057*** 1.313***
Std. Err. 1.123 0.013 0.274 0.346 0.010 0.119
Adult magazines
Coeff. -2.369*** 0.032 0.077 -3.035*** 0.033 0.511***
Std. Err. 0.263 0.031 0.257 0.150 0.032 0.160
Table 3 displays Logit demand estimates with instruments (“IV Logit”) and without instru-
ments (“Logit”) for the six largest magazine groups in our data. The dependent variable is
market share relative to the “outside” good. The explanatory variables are real copy price, the
natural logarithm of the number of content pages and the ratio of advertising pages to content
pages. The specification additionally contains a constant term, a linear time trend and three
quarter dummies variables.
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Appendix B: Mean Group Estimation
Basic setup
We adopt a log–linear monopoly model for magazine circulation, qjt, in our
magazine–specific estimation. Determinants of demand are cover prices, pjt, the
number of content pages, cjt, and the ratio of advertising pages to content pages
(“advertising share”), ajt.
Our estimation equation of interest is:
ln(qjt) = αjln(pjt) + βjln(cjt) + γjln(ajt) + µj + ηjt,
where the parameter of interest is γ, the “nuisance” or “utility cost” parameter
as it is referred to in the theoretical literature. The subscripts denote magazine
j observed at time t, parameter µj denotes a time–invariant magazine–specific
effect which absorbs all time–invariant magazine “fixed effects” such as magazine
periodicity or magazine ownershipand ηjt is an idiosyncratic error term.
1
Note that the parameters of interest in Equation (6) are magazine–specific.
The long time–series dimension of our data allows us to identify the model param-
eters without imposing any homogeneity restrictions. The mean of the parameter
estimates is the Mean Group Estimate (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). For example,
αMGE = 1/N
∑N
j=1 αj with a corresponding variance of 1/(N(N − 1))
∑N
j=1(αj−
αMGE)
2, where N denotes the number of magazines under consideration.
Many of the time series of the magazines in our data have unit roots, even if
when it is accounted for linear time trends. Since our time series under consid-
eration also exhibit substantial seasonality, we estimate Equation (6) in annual
differences (i.e. fourth differences in our quarterly data). Differentiation removes
the magazine–specific fixed effect, µi.
Identification
Our main identifying assumption for the magazine–specific monopoly model esti-
mations is that (unobserved) cost factors are common across magazines published
by a magazine’s own publisher and that other (demand–side) shocks specific to
the magazine are not correlated with these factors, an approach similar to that
used by Hausman and Taylor (1981), Hausman et al. (1994) and Berry et al.
(1995). This means that cover prices of a publisher’s magazines in other seg-
ments of the magazine market are assumed to be driven by common underlying
costs associated with a publisher’s production, distribution and marketing of its
magazines to readers. These costs also determine the particular magazine’s cover
prices, but are assumed to be uncorrelated with the disturbances in the maga-
zine demand equations. This is why the average cover price of a publisher’s other
magazines can be used as an instrument for cover prices. The same logic applies
to the use of the average advertising share of a publisher’s other magazines as an
instrument for a magazine’s advertising share.
1To the extent that the share of different types of content does not vary much across time
within magazines for German magazines (Kaiser 2007), the fixed effect also captures magazine
content.
26
To give an example for our cover price instruments, suppose that a cost shock
hits the own publisher. Such a shock could be caused by (i) changes in the
contractual relations between the publisher and the firm the publisher outsources
printing to, (ii) changes in the discounts which that firm receives on pulp and
paper purchase, (iii) management changes or (iv) changes in publisher strategies
that lead to changes in the possibilities to use the same editorial material in
different magazines etc. These shocks will be correlated with production cost
and hence with magazine prices but not with demand shocks.
Our example for our advertising share instrument is that a particular publisher
may form an ongoing relationship with a large advertising client through one of
its magazines, but this will tend to raise demand for advertising in the publisher’s
other magazines, given some large advertisers may place advertisements across
different magazine markets (“cross–selling” as it is termed in the media industry).
Thus, we use the average advertising share of a publisher’s other magazines to
instrument the advertising share of a particular magazine produced by the same
publisher.
Additional cost–side instruments for cover prices are the natural logarithm of
the number of magazine titles published by the own publisher in a given quarter
(a proxy variable for returns to scope in production), the natural logarithm of the
total number of pages printed by the own publisher in a given quarter (a proxy
for returns to scale in production) and a pulp and paper production price index.
Our instruments are differenced since our endogenous variables are differenced
as well. We occasionally use levels as instruments as well.
The table below presents our magazine–specific estimates.
27
R
e
su
lt
s
w
it
h
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
O
v
e
r
id
.
J
o
in
t
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
te
st
s
ln
(p
r
ic
e
)
A
d
sh
a
r
e
ln
(c
o
n
te
n
t
p
a
g
e
s)
r
e
st
r
.
P
r
ic
e
A
d
sh
a
r
e
C
o
e
ff
.
p
–
v
a
l.
C
o
e
ff
.
p
–
v
a
l.
C
o
e
ff
.
p
–
v
a
l.
p
–
v
a
l.
p
–
v
a
l.
p
–
v
a
l.
7
T
a
g
e
-0
.9
2
0
.2
5
0
.9
7
0
.4
1
1
.4
7
0
.0
8
0
.1
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
9
A
u
f
ei
n
en
B
li
ck
-0
.1
2
0
.7
9
0
.2
4
0
.0
0
0
.7
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
A
u
to
B
il
d
-0
.6
5
0
.2
7
-0
.5
2
0
.1
6
-0
.4
4
0
.4
0
0
.4
8
0
.0
0
0
.5
0
A
u
to
Z
ei
tu
n
g
-0
.0
6
0
.6
2
-0
.1
9
0
.2
8
0
.3
8
0
.3
5
0
.2
6
0
.0
5
0
.3
2
A
u
to
,
M
o
to
r
u
n
d
S
p
o
rt
-0
.3
5
0
.1
2
0
.1
2
0
.0
7
0
.0
7
0
.6
9
0
.2
0
0
.0
1
0
.2
8
B
o¨
rs
e
O
n
li
n
e
1
.3
9
0
.1
3
-0
.0
8
0
.6
5
-0
.0
8
0
.8
5
0
.3
2
0
.0
5
0
.8
9
B
il
d
d
er
F
ra
u
0
.7
8
0
.2
1
0
.2
9
0
.0
1
0
.2
7
0
.1
7
0
.2
7
0
.0
0
0
.2
7
B
il
d
d
er
W
is
se
n
sc
h
a
ft
0
.5
1
0
.5
5
0
.3
0
0
.0
4
0
.8
0
0
.0
2
0
.4
6
0
.8
6
0
.1
1
B
ra
v
o
G
ir
l
-5
.3
4
0
.2
1
2
.3
0
0
.1
5
1
.0
6
0
.6
3
0
.8
7
0
.0
2
0
.1
0
B
ri
g
it
te
-0
.0
3
0
.9
6
0
.0
4
0
.6
5
0
.0
0
0
.9
5
0
.3
0
0
.5
2
0
.5
3
B
u
n
te
-1
.4
8
0
.4
6
-0
.3
7
0
.2
7
0
.0
9
0
.7
4
0
.1
7
0
.9
0
0
.7
2
B
u
rd
a
M
o
d
e+
M
a
g
a
zi
n
-0
.7
7
0
.0
1
0
.0
5
0
.5
1
0
.0
8
0
.6
5
0
.3
8
0
.3
4
0
.6
3
C
a
p
it
a
l
-0
.0
4
0
.8
0
-0
.0
7
0
.3
0
-0
.0
4
0
.5
4
0
.8
8
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
C
h
ip
-0
.4
3
0
.6
8
0
.2
8
0
.1
0
0
.4
7
0
.7
1
0
.6
4
0
.0
6
0
.5
2
C
in
em
a
-1
.2
6
0
.9
7
2
.6
0
0
.5
5
1
.6
8
0
.5
7
0
.1
8
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
C
o
sm
o
p
o
li
ta
n
-0
.2
4
0
.6
7
0
.3
6
0
.4
5
0
.3
1
0
.6
2
0
.3
5
0
.0
1
0
.6
3
D
a
s
G
o
ld
en
e
B
la
tt
-0
.2
8
0
.0
1
0
.2
5
0
.5
5
0
.3
6
0
.2
6
0
.6
1
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
D
a
s
H
a
u
s
-0
.7
2
0
.1
8
-0
.0
9
0
.6
8
-0
.0
3
0
.9
3
0
.4
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
D
a
s
N
eu
e
-0
.1
5
0
.9
7
3
.9
1
0
.0
4
0
.7
2
0
.4
5
0
.4
1
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
D
a
s
N
eu
e
B
la
tt
-0
.2
6
0
.1
7
0
.6
6
0
.0
6
0
.2
1
0
.4
9
0
.1
6
0
.2
0
0
.1
4
D
a
s
n
eu
e
W
o
ch
en
en
d
-6
.0
2
0
.8
6
-2
.4
6
0
.1
6
-3
.9
6
0
.0
4
0
.2
3
0
.1
3
0
.2
3
D
er
S
p
ie
g
el
-0
.4
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
3
0
.2
6
-0
.0
1
0
.7
6
0
.3
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
D
ie
A
k
tu
el
le
-2
.4
6
0
.0
0
0
.2
1
0
.7
9
-0
.1
6
0
.5
0
0
.4
4
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
D
ie
Z
w
ei
-0
.2
9
0
.9
4
1
.3
5
0
.3
4
-0
.9
9
0
.1
6
0
.4
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
D
M
E
u
ro
-0
.5
5
0
.6
4
-0
.0
2
0
.7
9
-0
.1
2
0
.6
7
0
.8
4
0
.0
0
0
.1
8
E
ch
o
d
er
F
ra
u
-1
.4
1
0
.0
6
-0
.3
8
0
.5
6
-0
.2
1
0
.6
7
0
.7
2
0
.0
0
0
.7
7
E
in
H
er
z
fu¨
r
T
ie
re
-1
.4
1
0
.4
5
0
.2
5
0
.8
7
-0
.3
7
0
.8
2
0
.1
7
0
.0
0
0
.2
0
E
ll
e
-1
.3
8
0
.1
0
-0
.1
9
0
.3
6
-0
.5
7
0
.0
8
0
.1
9
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
E
lt
er
n
-0
.2
1
0
.3
3
0
.0
9
0
.0
9
0
.0
8
0
.3
3
0
.1
1
0
.0
0
0
.1
4
E
ss
en
&
T
ri
n
k
en
-0
.2
9
0
.7
7
-0
.0
1
0
.6
3
-0
.3
2
0
.5
9
0
.7
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
F
u¨
r
S
ie
-0
.0
5
0
.8
3
0
.1
1
0
.3
3
-0
.0
5
0
.7
5
0
.4
7
0
.0
0
0
.5
4
F
er
n
se
h
w
o
ch
e
-2
.7
2
0
.1
3
1
.2
2
0
.0
0
0
.2
1
0
.2
2
0
.2
5
0
.0
0
0
.3
1
F
lo
ra
-0
.0
2
0
.9
5
0
.0
3
0
.7
4
0
.2
4
0
.2
2
0
.1
8
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
fo
to
M
A
G
A
Z
IN
-0
.3
6
0
.7
4
-2
.0
4
0
.3
5
-0
.3
9
0
.7
4
0
.9
3
0
.0
3
0
.6
1
F
ra
u
a
k
tu
el
l
-0
.1
0
0
.4
6
0
.4
5
0
.2
9
-0
.1
8
0
.6
6
0
.2
7
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
F
ra
u
im
L
eb
en
-0
.1
0
0
.7
5
1
.2
9
0
.0
0
0
.6
0
0
.0
2
0
.3
6
0
.0
0
0
.7
4
F
ra
u
im
S
p
ie
g
el
-0
.0
3
0
.1
3
0
.2
4
0
.6
7
-0
.1
2
0
.8
0
0
.3
1
0
.3
8
0
.0
0
F
ra
u
m
it
H
er
z
-0
.7
8
0
.8
5
-0
.6
4
0
.4
8
-0
.5
8
0
.4
0
0
.4
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
F
re
iz
ei
t
R
ev
u
e
-0
.0
1
0
.8
6
0
.2
3
0
.3
6
0
.4
8
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.4
5
0
.6
2
F
re
u
n
d
in
-0
.4
6
0
.3
1
-0
.0
1
0
.9
0
-0
.0
1
0
.8
6
0
.2
1
0
.1
2
0
.8
9
28
O
v
e
r
id
.
J
o
in
t
s
ig
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
t
e
s
t
s
ln
(
p
r
ic
e
)
A
d
s
h
a
r
e
ln
(
c
o
n
t
e
n
t
p
a
g
e
s
)
r
e
s
t
r
.
P
r
ic
e
A
d
s
h
a
r
e
C
o
e
ff
.
p
–
v
a
l.
C
o
e
ff
.
p
–
v
a
l.
C
o
e
ff
.
p
–
v
a
l.
p
–
v
a
l.
p
–
v
a
l.
p
–
v
a
l.
F
u
n
k
U
h
r
-0
.2
5
0
.0
6
0
.1
5
0
.8
3
-1
.3
4
0
.1
3
0
.7
7
0
.9
4
0
.3
2
G
e
o
-0
.3
9
0
.3
3
-0
.0
7
0
.3
7
-0
.0
1
0
.3
3
0
.1
2
0
.1
3
0
.0
1
G
e
o
S
a
is
o
n
-0
.1
5
0
.1
7
0
.0
1
0
.4
0
-0
.0
3
0
.7
4
0
.5
0
0
.2
6
0
.1
2
G
lu¨
c
k
s
R
a¨
ts
e
l
-0
.4
4
0
.0
1
0
.9
0
0
.5
8
-0
.0
3
0
.9
8
0
.2
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
G
lu¨
c
k
s
R
e
v
u
e
-1
.3
7
0
.0
3
2
.5
7
0
.0
0
1
.8
4
0
.0
0
0
.3
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
G
u
te
F
a
h
rt
-1
.1
9
0
.2
7
0
.0
6
0
.6
3
0
.3
8
0
.5
5
0
.6
8
0
.3
1
0
.3
4
G
u
te
r
R
a
t!
-0
.0
9
0
.8
4
0
.1
3
0
.4
2
1
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.4
3
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
H
o¨
rz
u
-0
.3
6
0
.1
9
-0
.1
9
0
.7
1
-0
.9
2
0
.0
4
0
.7
0
0
.1
0
0
.0
0
H
e
im
u
n
d
W
e
lt
-1
.8
3
0
.0
4
-0
.3
5
0
.8
8
-0
.1
0
0
.9
5
0
.1
7
0
.0
0
0
.3
1
Im
p
u
ls
e
-0
.0
4
0
.9
1
0
.1
7
0
.0
7
0
.6
3
0
.2
2
0
.4
5
0
.1
1
0
.1
9
In
g
ri
d
-0
.1
9
0
.3
8
0
.0
5
0
.4
7
0
.5
2
0
.1
0
0
.8
9
0
.0
0
0
.3
4
J
o
u
rn
a
l
fu¨
r
d
ie
F
ra
u
-1
.6
0
0
.0
7
0
.1
8
0
.7
7
0
.0
7
0
.9
5
0
.5
8
0
.2
8
0
.3
0
K
o
c
h
e
n
&
G
e
n
ie
ß
e
n
-2
.0
8
0
.0
4
0
.4
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
0
.0
1
0
.9
9
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
K
o
sm
o
s
-0
.5
1
0
.0
6
-0
.1
2
0
.3
1
0
.2
4
0
.6
2
0
.2
9
0
.1
6
0
.1
2
L
e
b
e
n
&
e
rz
ie
h
e
n
-1
.9
6
0
.0
1
0
.0
9
0
.5
9
0
.4
1
0
.6
2
0
.8
4
0
.0
0
0
.3
8
M
a¨
d
c
h
e
n
-0
.9
4
0
.1
4
-0
.0
9
0
.0
6
0
.1
9
0
.6
1
0
.6
4
0
.0
3
0
.5
8
M
a
n
a
g
e
r
M
a
g
a
z
in
-0
.1
6
0
.8
4
-0
.0
2
0
.8
2
0
.6
1
0
.6
5
0
.3
3
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
M
a
x
-0
.7
5
0
.1
8
0
.4
6
0
.0
1
0
.5
3
0
.0
3
0
.2
4
0
.1
6
0
.0
2
M
a
x
i
-0
.3
2
0
.7
9
0
.3
3
0
.3
9
0
.5
0
0
.3
0
0
.2
6
0
.3
7
0
.3
8
M
e
in
sc
h
o¨
n
e
r
G
a
rt
e
n
-2
.4
4
0
.2
2
0
.2
4
0
.3
5
0
.4
4
0
.3
3
0
.5
2
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
M
e
in
e
F
a
m
il
ie
&
Ic
h
-2
.1
0
0
.1
6
0
.4
0
0
.0
7
0
.4
7
0
.2
0
0
.1
2
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
M
e
ri
a
n
-0
.5
9
0
.0
5
0
.2
8
0
.0
5
-0
.3
0
0
.5
5
0
.9
5
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
M
in
i
-1
.3
8
0
.8
6
6
.9
4
0
.0
4
0
.2
3
0
.8
0
0
.3
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
m
o
tA
u
to
sT
e
st
T
e
c
h
n
ik
-2
.8
0
0
.0
5
0
.4
0
0
.7
4
1
.1
5
0
.3
7
0
.2
7
0
.1
5
0
.0
4
M
o
to
rr
a
d
-0
.2
2
0
.8
9
2
.6
8
0
.0
5
1
.1
9
0
.0
5
0
.3
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
9
M
o
to
rr
a
d
,
R
e
is
e
n
&
S
p
o
rt
-0
.3
7
0
.7
4
0
.3
7
0
.8
4
3
.9
3
0
.5
5
0
.2
4
0
.5
1
0
.0
0
N
e
u
e
M
o
d
e
-0
.0
5
0
.8
9
0
.0
8
0
.0
8
0
.6
6
0
.1
2
0
.7
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
N
e
u
e
R
e
v
u
e
-0
.4
1
0
.0
9
0
.0
7
0
.7
5
-0
.6
4
0
.0
3
0
.6
0
0
.0
7
0
.3
3
N
e
u
e
W
e
lt
-0
.3
3
0
.4
9
0
.9
2
0
.1
9
-0
.7
2
0
.0
2
0
.9
8
0
.0
1
0
.0
4
P
.M
.M
a
g
a
z
in
-0
.5
5
0
.0
8
0
.1
1
0
.6
7
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.1
4
0
.0
7
0
.0
1
P
e
tr
a
-1
.4
2
0
.0
1
-0
.0
9
0
.5
1
0
.0
8
0
.9
7
0
.5
2
0
.4
1
0
.1
9
P
la
y
b
o
y
-0
.3
3
0
.5
2
0
.6
8
0
.0
7
1
.6
4
0
.0
0
0
.1
1
0
.1
2
0
.1
9
P
o
p
R
o
c
k
y
-0
.6
5
0
.2
7
-0
.0
9
0
.5
6
1
.6
5
0
.4
4
0
.2
4
0
.1
5
0
.0
0
P
o
p
c
o
rn
-1
.3
7
0
.3
7
1
.1
5
0
.0
3
0
.3
0
0
.2
1
0
.3
4
0
.6
3
0
.0
7
P
ra
li
n
e
-1
.5
4
0
.0
5
-2
.5
3
0
.1
7
-2
.6
3
0
.0
7
0
.1
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
P
S
-D
a
sS
p
o
rt
-M
o
to
rr
a
d
M
a
g
a
z
in
-0
.4
2
0
.6
0
1
.3
0
0
.0
7
0
.5
2
0
.0
4
0
.1
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
Q
u
ic
k
-0
.7
0
0
.1
2
0
.4
6
0
.0
5
-0
.2
9
0
.2
2
0
.1
5
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
R
a
ll
y
e
R
a
c
in
g
-3
.1
1
0
.0
0
-0
.0
1
0
.9
4
-0
.3
3
0
.7
6
0
.3
0
0
.3
4
0
.0
0
S
c
h
o¨
n
e
r
E
ss
e
n
-3
.6
0
0
.0
7
-0
.6
2
0
.2
1
0
.2
7
0
.6
2
0
.8
2
0
.5
3
0
.0
1
S
e
lb
e
rM
a
c
h
e
n
-0
.6
2
0
.5
8
-0
.0
2
0
.9
4
0
.6
0
0
.5
2
0
.5
6
0
.4
3
0
.0
2
S
e
lb
st
is
t
d
e
r
M
a
n
n
-0
.3
7
0
.5
8
0
.3
6
0
.2
1
0
.1
4
0
.2
1
0
.1
4
0
.6
6
0
.3
0
S
p
e
k
tr
u
m
d
e
r
W
is
se
n
sc
h
a
ft
-0
.0
4
0
.9
5
0
.0
7
0
.8
3
0
.3
1
0
.8
5
0
.4
1
0
.0
0
0
.2
0
S
p
ie
le
n
u
n
d
L
e
rn
e
n
-1
.0
7
0
.0
2
0
.2
3
0
.5
2
-0
.1
7
0
.7
5
0
.7
6
0
.6
9
0
.0
2
S
p
o
rt
A
u
to
-0
.5
1
0
.1
9
-0
.3
1
0
.0
2
-0
.2
5
0
.4
1
0
.2
0
0
.3
7
0
.1
7
S
p
o
rt
B
il
d
-1
.1
2
0
.0
3
-0
.2
0
0
.2
7
2
.6
4
0
.4
6
0
.9
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
7
S
te
rn
-6
.7
3
0
.0
2
3
.2
1
0
.1
0
-0
.1
7
0
.3
1
0
.3
4
0
.2
6
0
.0
4
S
u
rf
-1
.5
9
0
.2
8
0
.7
5
0
.0
0
-0
.5
6
0
.9
0
0
.3
0
0
.0
3
0
.1
5
T
e
n
n
is
M
a
g
a
z
in
-1
.4
0
0
.1
6
-0
.0
1
0
.9
8
0
.4
0
0
.6
6
0
.6
8
0
.0
3
0
.0
2
T
in
a
-0
.0
9
0
.8
4
0
.1
4
0
.1
3
3
.0
3
0
.0
7
0
.1
5
0
.0
8
0
.0
0
T
V
H
o¨
re
n
u
n
d
S
e
h
e
n
-1
.0
7
0
.7
2
-0
.1
1
0
.6
0
0
.0
9
0
.5
2
0
.2
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
V
it
a
l
-2
.6
7
0
.0
0
1
.8
5
0
.0
0
3
.2
8
0
.3
5
0
.2
4
0
.0
0
0
.1
2
W
e
lt
b
il
d
-0
.1
4
0
.9
2
0
.1
1
0
.5
7
0
.4
3
0
.1
3
0
.4
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
W
ir
ts
c
h
a
ft
sw
o
c
h
e
-5
.4
6
0
.0
3
0
.3
0
0
.6
6
-0
.7
4
0
.6
3
0
.1
4
0
.3
8
0
.0
2
W
o
h
n
id
e
e
-1
.5
3
0
.2
3
-0
.3
9
0
.3
4
-0
.3
3
0
.2
8
0
.3
9
0
.3
1
0
.0
4
Z
u
h
a
u
se
w
o
h
n
e
n
-0
.0
4
0
.9
3
0
.1
2
0
.7
6
0
.0
0
0
.6
9
0
.8
1
0
.0
5
0
.0
1
29
In some cases we also use advertising shares in other magazines in the own
market segment as instruments. Note that we assume monopoly demand but
that advertisers may still choose to place their advertisement wherever they want.
Some advertisers may even “multi–home”, i.e. place ads in different magazines.
Our additional instruments hence are close to Berry et al.’s (1995) suggestion
to use functions of other products characteristics as instruments. The list of
instruments eventually used for each magazine–specific estimation is available
from the authors upon request.
Monopoly model test
We test our assumption of monopoly model by adding prices of other magazines
in the own magazine segment to each magazine–specific equation. We stack
each estimation equation for each magazine segment and impose symmetry. For
example, consider a two–magazine case where magazines A and B are competing.
Our system of equations then reads:
ln(qAt) = αAAln(pAt) + αABln(pBt) + βAln(cAt) + γAln(aAt) + µA + ηAt (2)
ln(qBt) = αBAln(pAt) + αBBln(pBt) + βBln(cBt) + γBln(aBt) + µB + ηBt.(3)
The cross–price effects are αAB and αBA. We impose symmetry so αAB = αBA.
αAA and αBB are the own–price effects of magazine A and magazine B, respec-
tively. If αAB = αBA 6= 0, we cannot accept the monopoly model. If more than
two magazines are involved, we apply tests for joint significance.
We instrument the prices of competing magazines by their respective prices
of other magazines published by their own publisher.
The table below presents Mean Group estimation results for the competitive
model are the Car magazine segment. We omit the results for other magazine
groups for brevity. They are available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix C: results for random coefficients logit specifications
Random coefficients I Random coefficients II
Mean utility Variance Mean utility Variance
Constant Price Content Adshare Adshare Constant Price Content Adshare Price Adshare
Women’s
Coeff. -4.23 -1.54 0.05 0.34 1.41 -4.40 -1.38 0.04 0.84 0.03 0.42
Std. Err. 0.18 0.49 0.02 0.58 0.58 0.16 0.62 0.02 0.67 3.42 1.45
Business and politics
Coeff. -6.96 -0.26 0.08 0.24 0.49 -6.95 -0.27 0.09 0.24 0.00 0.51
Std. Err. 1.20 0.58 0.02 0.64 0.72 1.28 0.58 0.02 0.62 3.18 0.69
Car
Coeff. -6.53 -0.87 0.00 0.73 0.17 -6.54 -0.88 0.00 0.73 0.12 0.10
Std. Err. 0.34 0.14 0.02 0.51 2.21 0.23 0.28 0.02 0.52 1.09 2.36
Interior design
Coeff. -6.54 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.05 -6.17 -0.83 0.07 -0.03 0.95 0.05
Std. Err. 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.52 1.15 0.11 0.12 0.70 0.18
TV
Coeff. -3.82 0.73 0.04 -1.90 3.84 -0.02 -5.72 0.03 0.61 7.05 -2.39
Std. Err. 0.76 1.49 0.02 0.85 0.70 1.23 2.52 0.02 0.98 2.27 0.95
Adult
Coeff. -1.04 -1.87 0.00 -8.85 4.53 -1.25 -3.52 -0.01 -3.71 1.33 2.63
Std. Err. 0.96 0.57 0.04 4.38 1.57 0.61 1.18 0.04 2.20 0.65 1.14
Random coefficients III
Mean utility Variance
Constant Price Content Adshare Constant Price Adshare
Women’s
Coeff. -8.40 -2.03 0.07 1.30 12.98 0.00 1.12
Std. Err. 5.68 0.58 0.03 0.50 15.91 0.35 0.78
Business and politics
Coeff. -8.68 -0.29 0.08 0.24 2.47 0.09 0.66
Std. Err. 18.27 0.59 0.02 1.46 15.85 2.66 1.10
Car
Coeff. -13.17 -0.94 0.00 0.83 5.12 0.43 0.45
Std. Err. 26.40 0.35 0.02 0.50 15.05 0.38 0.67
Interior design
Coeff. -13.83 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 4.92 0.48 0.07
Std. Err. 19.63 0.30 0.13 0.12 9.77 0.55 0.22
TV
Coeff. -2.41 -1.28 0.03 -0.93 1.89 3.44 3.75
Std. Err. 1.32 2.13 0.02 1.17 3.54 2.03 0.69
Adult
Coeff. -1.55 -2.34 0.00 -2.33 0.12 0.79 1.68
Std. Err. 0.55 1.13 0.04 1.73 1.63 0.70 0.97
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